Local government financing during the

electoral business cycle: analysing the role of

intergovernmental political alignment on

municipality budgets in Greece by Kitsos, Anastasios & Proestakis, Antonios
BIRMINGHAM
BUSINESS
SCHOOL
Birmingham Business School
Discussion Paper Series
Local government financing during the  
electoral business cycle: analysing the role of 
intergovernmental political alignment on
municipality budgets in Greece
Anastasios Kitsos
Antonios Proestakis
2018-02
***  
 
This discussion paper is copyright of the University and the author. In addition, parts of 
the paper may feature content whose copyright is owned by a third party, but which has 
been used either by permission or under the Fair Dealing provisions. The intellectual 
property rights in respect of this work are as defined by the terms of any licence that is 
attached to the paper. Where no licence is associated with the work, any subsequent 
use is subject to the terms of The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (or as 
modified by any successor legislation).  
Any reproduction of the whole or part of this paper must be in accordance with the 
licence or the Act (whichever is applicable) and must be properly acknowledged. For 
non-commercial research and for private study purposes, copies of the paper may be 
made/distributed and quotations used with due attribution. Commercial distribution or 
reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holders.  
 
 
*** 
  
Anastasios Kitsosa & Antonios Proestakisb*  
aCity-REDI, Department of Strategy and International Business, University of 
Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom; bJoint Research Centre, European 
Commission, Brussels, Belgium 
Anastasios Kitsos: City-REDI, Birmingham Business School, kitasos@gmail.com 
Antonios Proestakis: Joint Research Centre, European Commission, 
antonios.proestakis@ec.europa.eu 
  
  
Local government financing during the electoral business cycle: 
analysing the role of intergovernmental political alignment on 
municipality budgets in Greece  
This paper examines the role of political alignment and the electoral business 
cycle on municipality revenues in Greece for the period 2003-2010. A panel 
dataset combining local and national elections with local budgets is used to run a 
fixed-effects econometric model. The findings suggest that municipalities which 
are politically aligned to the national government receive more funds in the run-
up to elections. This is evidence of electoral considerations in the allocation of 
resources and calls for policy changes promoting greater fiscal decentralisation to 
reduce pork-barrelling and rent-seeking, as well as the dependency between the 
local and national government levels. 
Keywords: distributive politics; government grants; pork-barrel; clientelism; 
fiscal decentralisation; partisanship 
Subject classification codes: H50, H72, H77, R12, R58 
Introduction 
This paper studies the existence of distributive politics in local government financing in 
Greece. Political considerations in the allocation of goods and services is not something 
novel. Under the umbrella term of distributive politics, they represent a notion that can 
be traced to ancient Roman times where patrons and clients would collaborate to reach 
mutually beneficial outcomes (Gruen, 1986). These considerations often lead to a 
misallocation of resources and challenge the equity, efficiency or countercyclical 
targets, which justify public policy intervention according to the theory of public 
finance (Musgrave, 1959). Whether they affect public investments, local government 
grants or special project transfers, these inefficiencies may translate into diminished 
growth and prosperity in different areas as well as growing spatial inequalities (Cutts & 
Webber, 2010; Johnston, 1977; Livert & Gainza, 2018). 
  
Two opposing political economy models have been developed to reflect 
distributive politics. The first suggests that incumbent governments will direct resources 
towards “core” voters (Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Golden & Min, 2013) whilst the 
second argues that it is the “swing” voters (those most likely to change their previous 
vote) that are targeted (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987). At the 
empirical level, these voters were largely converted to constituencies or regions that 
have traditionally voted for the incumbent party (core) or those that produced marginal 
results (swing).  
Numerous studies examine distributive politics in different countries and 
regularly find that political or electoral considerations do play a role in the allocation of 
resources. See for example the studies of Livert & Gainza (2018) for Chile, Castells & 
Solé-Ollé (2005) for Spain, Ward & John (1999) for the UK and Case (2001) for 
Albania. Within this context, and considering that the country is in the spotlight over the 
last decade with regards to the quality of governance and the financial crisis, Greece has 
not received adequate attention.  
This study aims at filling this gap. It examines one of the most fiscally 
centralised governance systems with a historic pattern of underperformance in 
governance indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2013) and electoral politics 
(Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, & Tselios, 2016b). The focus is on both the total municipal 
revenues and their disaggregation into grants, loans and own revenues. The empirical 
estimation uses a novel panel dataset that combines electoral results in national 
(parliamentary) and local elections, as well as local authority finances for the period 
2003-2010. It adds new dimensions to existing studies (Lambrinidis, Psycharis, & 
Rovolis, 2005; Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, & Tselios, 2016a; 2016b) by investigating a 
different source of intergovernmental transfers at a more granular level than NUTS 3 
  
regions (municipality level). Following this approach, it is possible to identify whether 
political considerations affected the distribution of resources from the central to the 
local government. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time a paper uses this data 
to examine electoral politics in the allocation of funding in Greece. 
The paper is structured as following. Section two reviews research on 
distributive politics in different countries. This is followed by an outline of the Greek 
case, as well as the data and methodology. Section five discusses the results of the 
econometric examination and is followed by the robustness checks and the conclusions. 
Our findings suggest that there is a significant misallocation of government grants 
towards politically aligned municipalities in the run-up to elections. This calls for a 
change in municipality financing policy and an increase of decentralisation in order to 
avoid the instances where local government is used as a vehicle for “pork-barrel” 
politics1. 
Distributive politics 
Two competing models have been developed to explain distributive politics. The core 
voter hypothesis suggests that information asymmetry on the voting intentions of 
individuals means that risk-averse politicians will target resource allocation to voters 
they know will support them (Cox & McCubbins, 1986). Hence, in this case, funds will 
be channelled towards a party’s core voters since it reflects a less risky investment 
leading to traditional machine politics. In contrast, the swing voter hypothesis suggests 
that voters without strong partisan alignments require less resources for politicians to 
secure their votes (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987). Hence, 
investment in swing voters is more productive since it can return more voters towards 
the incumbent party. In addition to these propositions, theory also predicts that 
governments will engage in looser fiscal and monetary policies closer to elections in 
  
order to secure re-election, leading to what is termed as the political business cycle 
(Golden & Min, 2013; Nordhaus, 1975; Tufte, 1980). 
All these models assume that the motivation for engaging in distributive politics 
is securing re-election and this conclusion is supported by a range of empirical studies. 
Examining grant allocation to Swedish municipalities, Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) 
find no evidence for the core voter hypothesis captured by an alignment dummy 
between the municipality and the party in national government, as well as the share of 
votes in favour of the incumbent party. On the contrary they find evidence supporting 
the swing voter hypothesis, represented by the cutpoint density of the party vote 
distribution and the difference between the vote shares. Similar results are found by 
Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005) who investigate infrastructure investments in Spanish 
NUTS 3 regions for the period 1987-1996. The authors find statistically significant and 
positive results of an electoral productivity composite indicator, reflecting swing voter 
influence, voter turnout, the importance of an extra representative and the vote margins. 
At the same time, they do not find statistically significant results on variables capturing 
partisanship such as the vote share of the incumbent party in the last elections and 
political alignment. Hence, these results support the predictions of the Dixit & 
Londregan (1996) model where funding is directed towards swing voters due to the low 
cost of securing their votes.  
Concurrently, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) provide some contrasting 
results. Examining Spanish municipalities between 1993 and 2003, they identify 
significant and positive effects of partisan alignment on intergovernmental grants. They 
do not find statistically significant coefficients on the difference in the vote shares 
between incumbent and competitor parties whilst Livert & Gainza find evidence that 
public investment in Chilean municipalities was influenced by the political alignment 
  
between local and national government levels (Livert & Gainza, 2018). These results 
support more the core voter hypothesis by Cox and McCubbins (1986) rather than the 
swing voter one. The differences between Castells & Solé-Ollé (2005) and Solé-Ollé & 
Sorribas-Navarro (2008) could be due to several factors such as the examination of 
different time periods and/or the geographical level of analysis with the former focusing 
on NUTS 3 regions and the latter on municipalities within them.  In addition to this 
study, Luca and Rodríguez-Pose (2015), investigating the distribution of public 
investment in Turkish provinces between 2005 and 2012 find that spending was 
directed to supporters of the incumbent party. However, the authors also find that 
socioeconomic conditions have been the main determinant of these allocations, 
primarily directed to the most developed areas for efficiency reasons. 
With regards to the electoral business cycle, again there is a range of empirical 
studies suggesting that spending is increased in the run up to elections. Shi and 
Svensson (2006) find that during 1975-1995 national fiscal deficits, as a share of the 
GDP, rose in pre-national election years with the result driven mainly by developing 
rather than developed countries. Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) examine Canadian 
provincial revenues between 1966 and 1997 and detect a clear electoral cycle where 
revenue increase through taxes is halted in pre-election years. Finally, rather than 
focusing on the volume of spending, Drazen and Eslava (2010) develop a model where 
what changes in pre-election periods, is the composition of spending, with a greater 
focus on expenditure in projects that allow targeting of specific segments of voters. 
Using data from Colombian municipalities for the period 1987-2000, they find that in 
pre-election years, expenditure on targetable projects increases whilst other types of 
spending decrease, as well as that voters respond positively to such targeting. 
  
For all its bad reputation (Lyrintzis, 1984; Nicolacopoulos, 2005; Rodríguez-
Pose et al., 2016b), Greece has been largely under-examined in this kind of literature. It 
was only recently that researchers investigated political considerations in the allocation 
of public investment and local authority fiscal autonomy. Lambrinidis et al. (2005) 
study the allocation of public infrastructure investments in 51 Greek NUTS 3 regions 
for 1982-1994 and find support for the electoral business cycle hypothesis but not pork-
barrelling. Using the same geography but all public investment expenditure for the 
period 1974-2009, Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2016a) identify that funding was directed 
towards core voters when the Socialist party (PASOK) was in government and to swing 
constituencies when the Liberals (ND) were in office. These studies provide evidence of 
the political distortions in the allocation of public investment at the NUTS 3 (prefecture) 
level.  
However, public investment is not the only channel through which the central 
government allocates resources to the sub-national level. Greece has a - directly elected 
- local government at the municipality level that sits below the NUTS 3 regional level 
and is largely financed by direct transfers from the central government. This is a 
statutory transfer that supports the functions of local government. Hence, any distortion 
in the allocation process creates inefficiencies that waste public funds whilst it promotes 
a dependency relationship (Psycharis, Zoi, & Iliopoulou, 2016) between local and 
central government. Finally, it offers a mechanism for incumbent parties to transfer 
funds to core or swing areas with greater accuracy than the constituency (prefectural) 
level. This stream of funding from the central to local government has been relatively 
unexplored across different countries for a number of reasons such as the difficulty in 
obtaining electoral and budget data at this level; the lack of concurrent local elections 
  
across the country and; fiscally decentralised systems that make these 
intergovernmental transfers less relevant. 
This paper focuses on this gap in the literature by examining political 
considerations in the central government’s grant allocations to municipalities. In doing 
so, it utilises a novel dataset that combines local government financial accounts with 
national and local election data and uses panel data econometrics. Prior to the 
presentation of these results, an analysis of the relationship between the local and 
national government in Greece is provided, together with descriptive statistics on the 
data to be used. 
The Greek case 
Before the econometric investigation, it is worth contextualising the Greek case since it 
reflects a system of governance which does not apply universally. After a 30-year long 
period of post-war instability, what was coined the third Greek Republic has been 
established in the mid-1970s with ‘enhanced’ proportional representation (i.e. a party 
can come to government with less than 50% of the votes). At the national level, Greek 
politics have retained past practices of clientelism and populism, but at the same time, 
they attempted to modernise the country with significant milestones including the 
country’s accession to the EU and its institutions (i.e. Common Market, EMU etc.) 
(Lyrintzis, 2005; Nicolacopoulos, 2005). 
Within this context, local governance had a central role to play both in terms of 
service provision and in targeting goods to particular segments of constituencies. By 
being closer to the voter, the local government level benefits from increased information 
on local needs and can assist the more efficient provision of public goods and services. 
Simultaneously, its ties to the national government and the national party system, render 
  
it a useful tool for targeting these goods and services for electoral reasons instead of 
equity or efficiency ones. 
The study focuses on what came to be known as the ‘Kapodistrias’ local 
government structure that involved the division of Greece into 1,034 municipalities led 
by directly elected mayors (Chorianopoulos, 2012). Financing local government in this 
period is largely influenced by the Central Autonomous Funds (KAP) (introduced in the 
late 1980s by law 1828/1989) that required that shares of several taxes such as income 
and value added tax, are ring-fenced to fund local government (Psycharis et al., 2016). 
Data and Research Design 
Data 
The data used for the investigation of political considerations in the allocation of 
funding from the state to municipalities, combines electoral results (at both the state and 
local government level) with budget information at the municipal level for the period 
2003-2010. Three parliamentary elections (2004, 2007 and 2009) and two local 
elections (2006 and 2010) were held during this period. This data is supplemented by 
local authority fiscal data, outlining municipality revenues and their breakdown into 
own revenues, grants and loans. 
National and local elections  
The local and parliamentary elections' dataset2, reports the political affiliation of the 
winners in the parliamentary and local elections. The data on mayors, predominantly 
cover the most populous municipalities. As a result, several local authorities are classed 
as "not-affiliated" because there is no affiliation information, in most of the cases, due 
to the small size of the municipality.  
  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 1 shows the number of affiliated (dark grey bars) and non-affiliated (light 
grey bars) municipalities in 2003, grouped by size (x-axis). The dots (solid for affiliated 
and hollow for non-affiliated) show the corresponding population (in millions, captured 
by the right y-axis). In 2003, 822 municipalities are not-affiliated of which, 65% (535) 
had at that time populations below 5,000 inhabitants and 96% (790) below 10,000. 
Concurrently, the 199 municipalities with affiliation information account for 7.17 
million citizens (about 2/3rds of the total population of Greece at that time) and 
correspond to more than 2/3rds of the total local budget of all municipalities3. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 2 shows the electoral timeline and the number of aligned and non-aligned 
mayors with the national government during the period 2003-2010. Not-affiliated 
municipalities are omitted from this analysis due to lack of information on 
municipalities' affiliation. In the parliamentary elections of 2004 and 2009, the 
opposition party won and the government changed during the respective calendar year; 
since the focus of this study is the local budget that is approved in the parliament at the 
end of each calendar year, we consider that the budget follows the affiliation of the 
incumbent government at the end of each last calendar year and the beginning of each 
current year (i.e. PASOK (the socialist party) for 2004 and ND (liberals) for 2009). For 
the remaining years, the active incumbent party is considered the full controller of the 
government budget each year. Consequently, in the period between 2005 and 2009 
(blue part of the timeline), ND is considered the incumbent party and therefore mayors 
originating or supported by ND are consider aligned (blue bar). In the same period, non-
  
aligned mayors supported either by PASOK (green (dashed) part of the two-coloured 
bar) or any other smaller opposition party (yellow (light and striped) part of the two-
coloured bar). Accordingly for the years 2003, 2004 and 2010 when PASOK was 
governing (green part of the timeline), aligned mayors were those originating or 
supported by PASOK (green (dashed) colour bar) and non-aligned, those supported by 
either ND (blue part of the two-coloured bar) or any other small opposition party 
(yellow (light and striped) part of the two-coloured bar). As can be seen below the 
variables of interest will be based on the data above, and will capture the effect of 
political alignment and the electoral business cycle on municipality funding. 
Municipality finances 
The local budget dataset4 contains analytical information on the revenues (regular and 
extraordinary) of all municipalities, annually for the period 2003-2010. On the left part 
of figure 3 we show the share of each revenue subcategory (as defined by the Hellenic 
Statistical Authority) over the total local budget (pooled data from all municipalities and 
all periods). In the outer ring of the pie chart we group these subcategories into three 
principal revenue categories which, together with total revenues, are the dependent 
variables of the analysis: grants, own revenues and loans5. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
On the right-hand side we show the annual data of these three revenue groups 
together with the total annual revenues (in billion €) of all (pooled) municipalities. 
There are eight actual data points (one for each year) that are connected with a line to 
highlight the overall trend. The data is also projected to the electoral time line which is 
also approximating the dates of the parliamentary and local elections. At first glance, we 
  
can observe that government grants are the principal source of municipality revenues 
(58.3% of the total budget), higher than the own revenues (36.1%).  
The intergovernmental grants to municipalities involve transfers (regular or 
extraordinary) for operational and investment costs. The majority of this funding comes 
from the KAP based on a formula and several distribution criteria6. The final formula is 
decided annually by the Ministers of Internal Affairs, Finance (and Economy if funding 
is intended for investment) after suggestions from the union of local government 
representatives (K.E.D.K.E.) and potentially allows for some discretionary behaviour. 
Similarly, but at a smaller scale, municipal loans (5.6% of the total) are an additional 
source of funding that is dependent on central budget and decision making. Laws 
2503/1997 and 3463/2006, allow municipalities to independently7 apply and obtain a 
loan from a national financial institution by using part of KAP or other special grants 
assigned to their budget for its repayment or guarantee.  
On the other hand, own revenues is a more autonomous source of income for the 
municipalities. They are mostly derived from user fees, charges and taxes which have 
been established and defined by the central government, following specific conditions 
on their level and increases. Local authorities are fully responsible for their collection 
and therefore can enjoy some degree of freedom. Own revenues is the mechanism that 
allows mayors to take initiatives and acquire additional funds to either replace reduced 
grants or to meet municipal needs without (to some extent) the central government's 
approval. In contrast with government grants and loans, increasing own revenues could 
bear political costs for local authorities if they are to come by raising additional taxes, 
fees and penalties.  
Method and model 
Given the large differences in municipality size (μ=10691.37, S.D.=30522.77), the data 
  
on local revenues is highly skewed towards larger local authorities. In order to correct 
for skewness towards larger municipalities, we attempt two basic transformations on the 
dependent variables (total revenues, grants, loans and own revenues); we analyse either 
their natural logarithm (log_Total, log_Grants, log_RevOwn and log_Debt), or their 
ratio to total revenues (Grants Dependency, Revenue Autonomy and Debt Dependency).  
While the logarithmic transformation is a standard corrective approach, 
commonly used in similar studies (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2016b)), the ratio to the 
total has only been used to approximate fiscal decentralisation (Psycharis et al., 2016). 
Here, total revenues are used to normalise each variable under investigation (e.g. own 
revenues) in order to perform a between-municipalities comparison (aligned vs. non-
aligned), as well as providing evidence of municipality dependency on specific types of 
income (grants, own, loans). Following Psycharis et. al (2016), the ratio of own 
revenues to the total is named Revenue Autonomy to signal the degree to which 
municipality finances are independent of central government decision making. 
Accordingly, the ratios of government grants and loans to the total revenues are called 
Grants Dependency and Debt Dependency to reflect how dependent local government 
finances are on revenues that are not within their control. Such a normalisation is 
superior to per-capita transformations since it accounts not only for several within-
municipality heterogeneity (e.g. population, geographical characteristics, etc.) but also 
for intertemporal effects or shocks that could disproportionately affected municipalities 
(e.g. financial crisis, political shocks, Olympic Games etc.).  
Under the electoral politics prism in Greece, the main hypothesis is that aligned 
municipalities enjoy preferential treatment from the government with respect to 
financing. It is expected that this favourable treatment will be more intense in the run-up 
to elections due to vote-seeking behaviours either by the incumbent party in central 
  
government or by mayoral candidates.  Our main hypothesis can then be sub-
categorised as follows (for both transformations τ: log or ratio to total): 
 A. Aligned municipalities receive more grants than non-aligned ones;  
 B. Aligned municipalities receive more loans than non-aligned ones;  
 C. Aligned municipalities raise equal or less own revenues than non-aligned 
ones;   
 D. If all the above hypotheses hold, then total revenues will be significantly 
higher for aligned municipalities compared to non-aligned ones. 
As a result, the dependent variables will be analysed in two main dimensions; namely, 
the municipalities' political alignment and time (year). The political alignment will be 
captured by variable: 
 aligned: a dummy variable taking value 1 when a mayor's political affiliation 
matches the national government’s one and 0 otherwise. 
 In order to analyse the time dimension, two new variables are generated as follows:   
 pre_parl: a dummy variable indicating the period prior to parliamentary 
elections. It takes value 1 for the years 2003 and 2007 and 0 for the rest. 
 pre_local:  a dummy variable accounting for the period before local elections 
held in 2006. It takes value 1 for this year and 0 for the rest. 
Since the parliamentary elections were held during the first quarter of 2004 
(March, 7) and the second half of 2007 (September, 16) (figure 2), it was considered 
appropriate to use 2003 and 2007 as the pre-election years. Assuming that the budgets 
are determined at the beginning of the year, an incumbent government could not expect 
to significantly impact the election results by pork-barrelling in three months (as is the 
  
case for the 2004 national election) whilst this would be possible in nine months (as in 
the case of the 2007 election). In addition, pre_parl does not account for the 2009 
parliamentary elections (October, 4). This is because these elections were not planned 
(next ones expected to be in 2011) and were called for in September 2009 and with the 
national economy about to enter its long-lasting debt crisis. As a result, even if pork-
barrelling was an option, the incumbent party would not have the time to target funding 
to specific municipalities. In a similar vein, 2010 has been excluded from pre_local. 
During this year, the country was already facing the financial crisis which had a 
significant impact on the level of government transfers to municipalities (figure 3). As a 
result, funding for pork-barrel politics would be expected to be significantly diminished. 
Two robustness checks are being performed (appendices 2 and 4) in order to test these 
two assumptions and largely confirm the results. 
The variables of interest are the revenues of aligned municipalities during the 
pre-electoral years. For this reason the following two interactions are examined:  
 aligned_pre_parl: a dummy variable taking value 1 if both aligned and pre_parl 
are equal to 1, and 0 otherwise.   
 aligned_pre_local: a dummy variable taking value 1 if both aligned and 
pre_local are equal to 1, and 0 otherwise.  
A panel, fixed-effects econometric model is used to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity8. It controls for all time-invariant differences between municipalities 
(aligned vs. non-aligned), so that the estimated coefficients cannot be biased because of 
omitted time-invariant characteristics. We also use regionally clustered robust standard 
errors to allow for intragroup correlation at the level of prefecture (the observations are 
independent across prefectures but not necessarily within prefectures).   
  
The main independent variables are complemented by controls for the following 
time-variant characteristics: a) gover, a dummy variable to control whether different 
political parties have followed different policies with regards to local authority 
financing (i.e. focus on own revenues vs focus on grants) when they were in power; b) 
gdp_cap, a continuous variable indicating the GDP/capita of the prefecture9 in which a 
municipality belongs. This variable aims to control for the efficiency vs equity nexus on 
the distribution of public resources. Considering GDP/capita as a proxy for more (or 
less) economically successful areas, this variable could indicate whether government 
grants are directed to more efficient areas or places with greater need; c) liberal_party 
and d) other_party, two dummies indicating the specific affiliation of the mayor, using 
socialist_party as a reference group; e) yr2004, f) yr2005, g) yr2009 and h) yr2010, four 
year dummies controlling for the corresponding year and using yr2008 as reference 
group (variables pre_parl and pre_local already account for years 2003, 2006 and 
2007). 2008 is selected as a reference year since there was not any substantial political 
(e.g. elections) or economic (e.g. crisis, Olympic Games) shock taking place. For the 
same reasons, 2005 could also be used as a reference group (see appendix 1 for 
robustness check).    
Equation (1) describes the main empirical model (including interactions) of our 
analysis: 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑒_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑟𝑒_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑦𝑟2004𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑦𝑟2005𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑦𝑟2009𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑦𝑟2010𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (𝑒𝑞. 1) 
Where 
  
 Revit is the dependent variable (log_Total, log_Grants, log_OwnRev, log_Loans, 
Grants Dependency, Revenue Autonomy, or Debt Dependency), where 
i=municipality and t=time.  
 β(1-13) are the coefficients of the explanatory and control variables 
 αi (i=1….n) is the unknown intercept for each municipality 
 εit is the error term 
Results 
Table 1 reports the coefficients and corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) of 
the regressors for the models with dependent variables Log_Grants (A), Log_Loans10 
(B), Log_OwnRev (C) and Log_Total (D). Models A-D also correspond to the four 
hypotheses. The difference between models subscripted with "1" and "2" is that the 
latter include the interaction terms aligned_pre_parl and aligned_pre_local.  
The coefficients of pre_parl and pre_local are, in many cases significant, 
indicating that the years before elections have a statistically significant difference in 
funding compared to the reference year (2008). A comparison between table 1 and the 
robustness check using 2005 as the reference year (appendix 1) suggests that the sign 
and size of these coefficients is influenced by the choice of the reference year.  
Table 1 about here 
The main interest of the study is on the interactions aligned_pre_parl and 
aligned_pre_local which represent aligned municipalities in the run-up to national and 
local elections respectively. The coefficient of aligned_pre_parl is significant and 
positive in models A2 and D2 increasing grants and total revenues by 13% and 9.7% 
respectively. Aligned municipalities receive on average about €1.3m more grants and 
€1.9m more total revenues than non-aligned municipalities in the pre_parl periods. 
  
Similarly, the statistically significant coefficient for aligned_pre_local in A2 suggests 
that aligned municipalities also receive more grants (6.2% or €0.6m on average) than 
non-aligned ones in the run-up to local elections. 
With regards to specification B2, the statistically significant coefficient β3 should 
be treated with caution. The large number of zero values for log_Loans (see note 10) 
means that the size of the coefficient is inflated. Further investigation in appendix 3 
shows the results of a logistic regression (fixed-effects) using the dependent dummy 
variable D_Loans (taking the value 1 if loans>0, 0 otherwise). We find that in pre_parl 
periods, the probability of an aligned municipality to obtain a loan is 92% higher than 
the one of a non-aligned one.  
 Result 1: In the run-up to national elections, aligned municipalities receive more 
grants (A) and have greater probability in obtaining loans (B) than non-aligned 
municipalities. At the same time, there is no difference in own revenues (C). As 
a consequence, aligned municipalities obtain more total revenues (D) than non- 
aligned ones.  
 Result 2: In the run-up to local elections, aligned municipalities receive more 
grants (A). 
Attempting to explain why total revenues are not affected in pre-local elections periods, 
our attention is directed towards own revenues. Whilst in pre-national election periods, 
municipality own revenues appear to be positive, during pre-local election periods they 
turn negative, suggesting a substitution effect between grants and own revenues in the 
run-up to local elections. This could explain why total revenues are significantly 
different before national elections but not before local ones. However, it should be 
noted that the lack of statistical significance for the relevant coefficients in C2 means 
  
that the above arguments are more speculative rather than supported by econometric 
evidence. 
The control variables also provide interesting results. Variable gover which 
controls whether different political parties in the national government have pursued 
different policies with regards to municipality financing, suggests that one party focused 
more on grants and the other more on loans. Own revenues were not affected by either 
party. The coefficients for gdp_cap suggest that municipalities in prefectures with 
higher GDP/capita generate more own revenues and hence are more autonomous but 
they do not receive more grants or loans. It is probable that this reflects the limitations 
of using GDP/capita at the prefecture level to proxy growth levels in different 
municipalities rather than the lack of equity or efficiency arguments in distributing 
government grants. 
The analysis of table 1 is repeated in table 2 using Grants Dependency, Debt 
Dependency and Revenue Autonomy as the dependent variables which are the ratios of 
grants, loans and own revenues to the total revenues. The findings on the effect of 
aligned_pre_parl and aligned_pre_local on grants are confirmed. In the run-up to 
national and local elections, aligned municipalities show statistically significant 
differences from non-aligned ones in the proportion of grants to their total revenues. In 
particular, the coefficient of aligned_pre_parl in A4 suggests that in pre-election 
(parliamentary) years, the share of grants to the total revenues is 1.34% higher for 
aligned municipalities. Similarly, the coefficients for aligned_pre_local in A4 and B4 
point to an increase of 1.84% in the share of grants to the total revenues and of 1.46% in 
the share of loans to the total.   
These results confirm that the increase observed at the logarithmic 
transformation is significant even in terms of proportionality, meaning that it is not just 
  
that aligned municipalities receive more grants in pre-election periods, but also that 
these are disproportionately increased against other revenues, thus increasing the 
dependency of aligned municipalities on government grants and loans. Moreover, the 
share of loans to the total revenues for aligned municipalities is 1.53% higher than the 
corresponding one for non-aligned municipalities, irrespectively of the period under 
examination.  Finally, with regards to the Revenue Autonomy, the negative and 
significant coefficients of aligned (C3), aligned_pre_parl and aligned_pre_local (C4) 
mirror the results on specifications A3-B4 and their effect on total revenues (Grants 
Dependency + Debt Dependency + Revenue Autonomy = 1) and similarly, the 
decreasing autonomy of municipalities. 
Table 2 about here 
Robustness checks  
Several robustness checks have been carried out to test the validity of the results. These 
involve changing the reference year to 2005, as well as including 2010 in pre_local and 
2009 in pre_parl. The outcomes of the robustness checks largely confirm the results of 
the main analysis, lending credence to the hypothesis that political considerations do 
affect the allocation of intergovernmental grants. 
Using 2005 as a reference year (appendix 1) instead of 2008 has virtually no 
effect on the main results. The coefficients and statistical significance of 
aligned_pre_parl and aligned_pre_local remain the same whilst the only difference 
observed is that the coefficients for pre_parl and pre_local change sign. As discussed 
earlier, this was expected considering the trajectory of total revenues in time and their 
components.  
  
Appendix 2 shows the regression results for when year 2010 is included in 
pre_local. The main results exclude this year from the pre-local election period and 
dummies since the year was a crisis one which has impacted negatively on government 
grants (figure 3). Including it in pre_local, does not affect the results for 
aligned_pre_parl which still suggest that aligned municipalities received more grants 
and had more total revenues in pre-national election periods. Its inclusion affects mainly 
the results on aligned_pre_local which loses the statistical significance of its coefficient 
in A2, together with the one for aligned_pre_parl in B2. We consider the reason for this 
to be the significant reduction in the size of government funding during the recession, 
which would also affect any attempt to assist aligned candidates in the run-up to local 
elections.  
Finally, in appendix 4, year 2009 is excluded from the year fixed effects and 
included in pre_parl. The 2009 elections were not planned and only declared a month in 
advance. Consequently, the decision was made not to include it as a pre-election year 
since there would be no opportunity for electoral politics. Testing for the effect of 
including 2009 in pre_parl, does not significantly change the results of 
aligned_pre_parl and aligned_pre_local. 
Conclusions 
Greece is a country that suffered for many years from lack of government efficiency 
related to electoral politics. However, it was not until recently that studies started to 
shed light on the nature of the allocation of resources from the Greek state to prefectures 
and whether these were subject to political considerations (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 
2016a, 2016b). This paper has focused on a different channel of government grants, the 
state funding to municipalities. Municipalities are significantly smaller than prefectures 
and hence allow better targeting of funding for electoral reasons. 
  
With a rich panel dataset combining 8 years (2003-2010) of municipality 
funding and election results, and by employing a range of econometric methods to 
address heterogeneity in the nature of the study and the data itself (see for example the 0 
values of loans and the use of regionally clustered robust standard errors), the paper 
finds evidence that electoral politics played a role in the distribution of government 
grants to municipalities. In particular, the results suggest that aligned municipalities 
receive approximately 13% more grants and have 9.7% more total revenues in the run-
up to national elections. On average, these figures correspond to €1.3m more grants and 
€1.9m more total revenues respectively. Concurrently, aligned municipalities show 
increased grant receipts (6.2%, €0.6m on average) compared to non-aligned ones during 
pre-local election years. Most of these results are confirmed by a range of robustness 
checks and provide evidence of both pork-barrelling and the electoral business cycle 
hypotheses.  
This significant misallocation of resources can impede long term economic 
growth and has strong implications for policy. First and foremost, the need to reduce 
pork-barrel politics calls for the greater empowerment of local government in raising 
their own revenues. With regards to the central government, the size of the government 
transfers allows for their misuse for electoral gains whilst it can create a rent-seeking 
environment where local authorities compete for providing the best (electoral) services 
to the incumbent party rather than the populations they represent. Secondly, being 
dependent on government transfers is detrimental to an environment that needs more 
local innovation in public service reform, with new ways of generating income and 
more efficient delivery of public services. As a result, minimising local government 
dependency on the state can achieve multiple benefits by reducing the opportunities for 
pork-barrelling and improving innovation and efficiency at the local level. 
  
Finally, the paper opens new avenues for further research. Using the available 
dataset, one avenue could be examining other potential considerations such as voter 
turnover etc. or specific accounts to find whether pork-barrelling takes place on certain 
types of revenues such as ’extraordinary grants for investment‘ for example. In addition, 
further research could test the effectiveness of this misallocation of resources by 
examining the electoral results in aligned and non-aligned municipalities. 
Notes 
1 According to OECD data, central government grants continue to dominate local government 
revenues up to 2016 which is the latest year of available data at the time of writing. 
2 Source: Greek Ministry of Internal Affairs. This was chosen as the most reliable source of 
information with sample sizes ranging from 1,001 municipalities in 2010 to 1,033 in 2007-
2009 out of a total of 1,034. 
3 Data from 2006 local elections (not shown here) yielded similar results in respect to affiliation 
frequency and population; about 169 municipalities containing 6.81 million citizens were 
reported in Ministry's website as affiliated. 
4 Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority for 2003-2009 and the Ministry of Internal Affairs for 
2010. 
5 Revenue sub-categories (and the corresponding code used by Hellenic Statistical Authority) 
OWN REVENUES: Income from (01) Fixed assets, (02) Current assets, (03) User fees 
and rights, (04) User fees and Services, (05) Taxes, (07) Other regular revenues, (11) the 
sale of fixed and current assets, (14) sponsorships, charities and heritages, (15) Penalties 
and fines, (16) Other extraordinary Revenues, (21) Regular and (22) Extraordinary 
revenues from past years; GRANTS: (06) Regular Grants for operational expenses, 
Extraordinary  Grants for (12) operational expenses, (13) for Investment; LOANS: (3) 
loans. 
6 The criteria of apportionment consider population, accessibility and inequality characteristics 
such as: a) length of water and sewage pipes, b) length and accessibility of road network, 
c) whether it is a mountainous, lowland or island municipality, d) the existing level of 
social services, e) the capacity to generate own revenues, f) population and its seasonal 
variations and trends, g) the average weather conditions and number of school classes and 
h) the environmental conditions. 
  
7 Due process in obtaining a loan (the procedure followed, as well as that the amount borrowed 
is within limits) is guaranteed by the regional administrator (government appointed role 
for 2003-2010) and an independent auditing body. 
8 Hausman test confirmed the prevalence of the fixed-effects over a random-effects model by 
rejecting the hypothesis that the unique errors (ui) are not correlated with the regressors. 
No multicollinearity has been detected in the choice of the independent variables. The only 
Tolerance value lower than 10%, is the one of gdp_cap which does not affect any of the 
results.  
9 Source: Eurostat. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, socio-economic indicators are 
unavailable for Greece for 2003-2010 below the NUTS3 level except from the Census 
carried out once every 10 years (and hence not offering variation in time). Prefectures are 
the government level immediately above the municipality level. They are NUTS3 regions 
and there are 51, covering the Greek territory. 
10 Since the sample has many municipalities (especially after 2004) with no (or negative) loans 
on their budget and the natural logarithm of zero is not defined, we substitute these zero 
values with "1" for not losing those observations. This problem doesn't exist when using 
the ratios in table 2. 
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Tables 
Table1: Fixed-effects Panel Data Analysis of Municipal Revenues (log). 
 (A1) (A2) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2) (D1) (D2) 
 log_Grants log_Grants log_Loans log_Loans log_OwnRev log_OwnRev log_Total log_Total 
aligned -0.00918 
(0.0243) 
-0.0468* 
(0.0270) 
0.298 
(0.281) 
-0.0412 
(0.285) 
-0.0327 
(0.0327) 
-0.0317 
(0.0323) 
0.00251 
(0.0254) 
-0.0220 
(0.0266) 
pre_parl -0.103*** 
(0.0181) 
-0.169*** 
(0.0250) 
0.826 
(0.638) 
0.253 
(0.658) 
-0.0392* 
(0.0200) 
-0.0603*** 
(0.0219) 
-0.0589** 
(0.0256) 
-0.109*** 
(0.0347) 
aligned_pre_parl  
 
0.121*** 
(0.0307) 
 
 
1.058** 
(0.499) 
 
 
0.0393 
(0.0322) 
 
 
0.0925*** 
(0.0313) 
pre_local -0.145*** 
(0.0333) 
-0.174*** 
(0.0305) 
0.613 
(0.748) 
0.319 
(0.809) 
-0.00246 
(0.0561) 
0.0360 
(0.0696) 
-0.109*** 
(0.0384) 
-0.116*** 
(0.0425) 
aligned_pre_local  
 
0.0604** 
(0.0273) 
 
 
0.616 
(0.762) 
 
 
-0.0814 
(0.0527) 
 
 
0.0139 
(0.0321) 
gover 0.305*** 
(0.0698) 
0.293*** 
(0.0703) 
-6.130*** 
(1.111) 
-6.227*** 
(1.106) 
-0.124 
(0.0952) 
-0.131 
(0.0973) 
0.186*** 
(0.0631) 
0.176*** 
(0.0647) 
gdp_cap -0.00782 
(0.00974) 
-0.00734 
(0.00969) 
0.134 
(0.190) 
0.139 
(0.190) 
0.0461*** 
(0.0123) 
0.0463*** 
(0.0123) 
0.00450 
(0.00845) 
0.00492 
(0.00830) 
liberal_party 0.0151 
(0.0244) 
0.0170 
(0.0254) 
-0.581 
(0.561) 
-0.573 
(0.585) 
-0.0123 
(0.0288) 
-0.00284 
(0.0317) 
-0.00967 
(0.0193) 
-0.00543 
(0.0211) 
other_party -0.0550 
(0.0497) 
-0.0535 
(0.0488) 
0.261 
(1.419) 
0.273 
(1.428) 
-0.0607 
(0.0496) 
-0.0587 
(0.0510) 
-0.0773** 
(0.0362) 
-0.0757** 
(0.0361) 
yr2004 -0.216*** 
(0.0720) 
-0.217*** 
(0.0715) 
7.431*** 
(0.895) 
7.416*** 
(0.888) 
0.154 
(0.0958) 
0.156 
(0.0965) 
-0.0783 
(0.0656) 
-0.0783 
(0.0655) 
yr2005 -0.299*** 
(0.0426) 
-0.301*** 
(0.0418) 
1.019 
(0.949) 
1.004 
(0.942) 
0.0291 
(0.0734) 
0.0319 
(0.0739) 
-0.204*** 
(0.0483) 
-0.204*** 
(0.0479) 
yr2009 0.240*** 
(0.0215) 
0.240*** 
(0.0215) 
-0.289 
(0.625) 
-0.287 
(0.625) 
-0.000306 
(0.0430) 
-0.000184 
(0.0431) 
0.136*** 
(0.0266) 
0.136*** 
(0.0266) 
yr2010 0.134** 
(0.0572) 
0.117* 
(0.0595) 
-7.077*** 
(1.278) 
-7.225*** 
(1.275) 
-0.120** 
(0.0486) 
-0.127** 
(0.0494) 
0.0483 
(0.0490) 
0.0350 
(0.0517) 
Constant 15.73*** 
(0.160) 
15.75*** 
(0.157) 
9.613*** 
(3.037) 
9.799*** 
(3.033) 
14.45*** 
(0.196) 
14.44*** 
(0.194) 
16.15*** 
(0.152) 
16.16*** 
(0.149) 
Observations 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 
N_g 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
sigma_e 0.287 0.286 5.512 5.511 0.357 0.357 0.270 0.269 
sigma_u 0.761 0.761 3.213 3.220 0.928 0.928 0.785 0.785 
rho 0.875 0.876 0.254 0.254 0.871 0.871 0.894 0.895 
The logarithmic transformation of municipal grants (A1, A2), loans (B1, B2), own revenues (C1, C2) and total revenues (D1, D2) are the 
dependent variables of the fixed-effects models (allowing for intragroup correlation at the prefecture level). The dummy variables 
aligned (=1 if municipality's and central government's affiliation are the same), pre_parl and pre_local (=1 for the years before the 
parliamentary (2003, 2007) and local (2006) elections respectively) and their interactions aligned_pre_parl and aligned_pre_local (in 
A2, B2, C2 and D2) are the main explanatory variables. We control for government affiliation (gover), prefecture GDP/capita (gdp_cap), 
municipality affiliation (liberal_party, other_party) and year effects (yr2004, yr2005, yr2009, yr2010).  We denote p-values by * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 and report standard errors in parentheses. Standard deviation of residuals within municipalities and of 
the overall term in each model are denoted with σu and σe respectively, with ρ= σ2u+(σ
2
u+σ
2
e) capturing the variance due to difference 
across panels.  
 
 
 
  
Table2: Fixed-effects Panel Data Analysis of Municipal Revenues (Ratio to total). 
 (A3) (A4) (B3) (B4) (C3) (C4) 
 Grants 
Dependency 
Grants 
Dependency 
Debt 
Dependency 
Debt 
Dependency 
Revenue 
Autonomy 
Revenue 
Autonomy 
aligned -0.00269 
(0.00414) 
-0.00838* 
(0.00494) 
0.0153*** 
(0.00474) 
0.0119** 
(0.00591) 
-0.0126*** 
(0.00449) 
-0.00349 
(0.00535) 
pre_parl -0.0246*** 
(0.00806) 
-0.0318*** 
(0.0102) 
0.0233* 
(0.0121) 
0.0199 
(0.0155) 
0.00129 
(0.00518) 
0.0119* 
(0.00659) 
aligned_pre_parl  
 
0.0134** 
(0.00527) 
 
 
0.00616 
(0.0101) 
 
 
-0.0196*** 
(0.00688) 
pre_local -0.0264*** 
(0.00972) 
-0.0351*** 
(0.0112) 
0.00507 
(0.0108) 
-0.00185 
(0.0124) 
0.0213*** 
(0.00615) 
0.0370*** 
(0.00896) 
aligned_pre_local  
 
0.0184* 
(0.0106) 
 
 
0.0146* 
(0.00853) 
 
 
-0.0330*** 
(0.0109) 
gover 0.0928*** 
(0.0138) 
0.0920*** 
(0.0136) 
-0.0226 
(0.0162) 
-0.0228 
(0.0163) 
-0.0702*** 
(0.0130) 
-0.0691*** 
(0.0131) 
gdp_cap -0.0118*** 
(0.00261) 
-0.0118*** 
(0.00261) 
0.00288 
(0.00224) 
0.00289 
(0.00222) 
0.00896*** 
(0.00175) 
0.00891*** 
(0.00174) 
liberal_party 0.0105 
(0.00779) 
0.00968 
(0.00786) 
-0.0136 
(0.00843) 
-0.0145 
(0.00869) 
0.00311 
(0.00886) 
0.00484 
(0.00930) 
other_party 0.0108 
(0.0198) 
0.0108 
(0.0198) 
-0.0121 
(0.0210) 
-0.0122 
(0.0209) 
0.00130 
(0.0171) 
0.00140 
(0.0170) 
Constant 0.756*** 
(0.0475) 
0.760*** 
(0.0478) 
0.00159 
(0.0424) 
0.00397 
(0.0430) 
0.242*** 
(0.0241) 
0.236*** 
(0.0235) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 
N_g 214 214 214 214 214 214 
sigma_e 0.0653 0.0653 0.0702 0.0702 0.0568 0.0564 
sigma_u 0.116 0.116 0.0371 0.0370 0.119 0.119 
rho 0.760 0.761 0.218 0.218 0.814 0.816 
The ratios of the municipal grants (A3, A4), loans (B3, B4) and own revenues (C3, C4) to the total revenues are the dependent variables 
of the fixed-effects models (allowing for intragroup correlation in the prefecture level). The independent variables are the same as 
table 1. Coefficients of the control variables are omitted for facilitating illustration. We denote p-values by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 and report standard errors in parentheses. σu, σe and ρ same as table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
TableS1: Fixed-effects Panel Data analysis on Municipalities' Revenues (log) with 2005 
as a reference year. 
 (A1) (A2) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2) (D1) (D2) 
 log_Grants log_Grants log_Loans log_Loans log_OwnRev log_OwnRev log_Total log_Total 
aligned -0.00918 
(0.0243) 
-0.0468* 
(0.0270) 
0.298 
(0.281) 
-0.0412 
(0.285) 
-0.0327 
(0.0327) 
-0.0317 
(0.0323) 
0.00251 
(0.0254) 
-0.0220 
(0.0266) 
pre_parl 0.196*** 
(0.0334) 
0.132*** 
(0.0425) 
-0.193 
(0.763) 
-0.751 
(0.788) 
-0.0682 
(0.0574) 
-0.0923 
(0.0698) 
0.145*** 
(0.0344) 
0.0951** 
(0.0443) 
aligned_pre_parl  
 
0.121*** 
(0.0307) 
 
 
1.058** 
(0.499) 
 
 
0.0393 
(0.0322) 
 
 
0.0925*** 
(0.0313) 
pre_local 0.154*** 
(0.0220) 
0.127*** 
(0.0288) 
-0.406 
(0.562) 
-0.685 
(0.731) 
-0.0315 
(0.0241) 
0.00403 
(0.0353) 
0.0948*** 
(0.0164) 
0.0880*** 
(0.0236) 
aligned_pre_local  
 
0.0604** 
(0.0273) 
 
 
0.616 
(0.762) 
 
 
-0.0814 
(0.0527) 
 
 
0.0139 
(0.0321) 
gover 0.305*** 
(0.0698) 
0.293*** 
(0.0703) 
-6.130*** 
(1.111) 
-6.227*** 
(1.106) 
-0.124 
(0.0952) 
-0.131 
(0.0973) 
0.186*** 
(0.0631) 
0.176*** 
(0.0647) 
gdp_cap -0.00782 
(0.00974) 
-0.00734 
(0.00969) 
0.134 
(0.190) 
0.139 
(0.190) 
0.0461*** 
(0.0123) 
0.0463*** 
(0.0123) 
0.00450 
(0.00845) 
0.00492 
(0.00830) 
liberal_party 0.0151 
(0.0244) 
0.0170 
(0.0254) 
-0.581 
(0.561) 
-0.573 
(0.585) 
-0.0123 
(0.0288) 
-0.00284 
(0.0317) 
-0.00967 
(0.0193) 
-0.00543 
(0.0211) 
other_party -0.0550 
(0.0497) 
-0.0535 
(0.0488) 
0.261 
(1.419) 
0.273 
(1.428) 
-0.0607 
(0.0496) 
-0.0587 
(0.0510) 
-0.0773** 
(0.0362) 
-0.0757** 
(0.0361) 
yr2004 0.0835** 
(0.0395) 
0.0835** 
(0.0396) 
6.412*** 
(0.579) 
6.412*** 
(0.581) 
0.124** 
(0.0520) 
0.125** 
(0.0521) 
0.126*** 
(0.0371) 
0.126*** 
(0.0373) 
yr2008 0.299*** 
(0.0426) 
0.301*** 
(0.0418) 
-1.019 
(0.949) 
-1.004 
(0.942) 
-0.0291 
(0.0734) 
-0.0319 
(0.0739) 
0.204*** 
(0.0483) 
0.204*** 
(0.0479) 
yr2009 0.539*** 
(0.0375) 
0.541*** 
(0.0368) 
-1.308 
(0.848) 
-1.291 
(0.850) 
-0.0294 
(0.0496) 
-0.0321 
(0.0493) 
0.340*** 
(0.0399) 
0.340*** 
(0.0392) 
yr2010 0.433*** 
(0.0875) 
0.418*** 
(0.0886) 
-8.096*** 
(1.623) 
-8.229*** 
(1.621) 
-0.149 
(0.107) 
-0.159 
(0.110) 
0.252*** 
(0.0730) 
0.239*** 
(0.0750) 
Constant 15.43*** 
(0.122) 
15.45*** 
(0.120) 
10.63*** 
(2.640) 
10.80*** 
(2.651) 
14.48*** 
(0.146) 
14.47*** 
(0.143) 
15.94*** 
(0.113) 
15.95*** 
(0.111) 
Observations 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 
N_g 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
sigma_e 0.287 0.286 5.512 5.511 0.357 0.357 0.270 0.269 
sigma_u 0.761 0.761 3.213 3.220 0.928 0.928 0.785 0.785 
rho 0.875 0.876 0.254 0.254 0.871 0.871 0.894 0.895 
The logarithmic transformation of municipal grants (A1, A2), loans (B1, B2), own revenues (C1, C2) and total revenues (D1, D2) are the 
dependent variables of the fixed-effects models (allowing for intragroup correlation in the prefecture level). The dummy variables 
aligned (=1 if municipality's and central government's affiliation are the same), pre_parl and pre_local (=1 for the years before the 
parliamentary (2003, 2007) and local (2006) elections respectively) and their interactions aligned_pre_parl and aligned_pre_local (in 
A2, B2, C2 and D2) are the main explanatory variables. We control for government affiliation (gover), prefecture GDP per Capita 
(gdp_cap), municipality affiliation (liberal_party, other_party) and year effects (yr2004, yr2008, yr2009, yr2010).  We denote p-
values by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 and report standard errors in parentheses. Standard deviation of residuals within 
municipalities and of the overall term in each model are denoted with σu and σe respectively, with ρ= σ2u +( σ
2
u+ σ
2
e) capturing the 
variance due to difference across panels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TableS2: Fixed-effects Panel Data analysis on Municipalities' Revenues (log) with 2010 
in pre_local and 2008 as a reference year. 
 (A1) (A2) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2) (D1) (D2) 
 log_Grants log_Grants log_Loans log_Loans log_OwnRev log_OwnRev log_Total log_Total 
aligned -0.00660 
(0.0245) 
-0.0233 
(0.0238) 
0.227 
(0.288) 
-0.172 
(0.375) 
-0.0338 
(0.0324) 
-0.0194 
(0.0337) 
0.00396 
(0.0254) 
0.000185 
(0.0250) 
pre_parl -0.115*** 
(0.0219) 
-0.178*** 
(0.0267) 
1.157** 
(0.541) 
0.728 
(0.604) 
-0.0341 
(0.0222) 
-0.0466** 
(0.0214) 
-0.0657** 
(0.0285) 
-0.111*** 
(0.0358) 
aligned_pre_parl  
 
0.119*** 
(0.0241) 
 
 
0.792 
(0.534) 
 
 
0.0244 
(0.0247) 
 
 
0.0852*** 
(0.0264) 
pre_local -0.0521** 
(0.0223) 
-0.0389* 
(0.0216) 
-1.948*** 
(0.695) 
-2.297** 
(0.900) 
-0.0417 
(0.0334) 
-0.0123 
(0.0461) 
-0.0568* 
(0.0299) 
-0.0351 
(0.0299) 
aligned_pre_local  
 
-0.0426 
(0.0395) 
 
 
0.686 
(0.814) 
 
 
-0.0681 
(0.0514) 
 
 
-0.0576 
(0.0345) 
gover 0.112*** 
(0.0414) 
0.112*** 
(0.0415) 
-0.829* 
(0.448) 
-0.853* 
(0.456) 
-0.0426 
(0.0526) 
-0.0414 
(0.0528) 
0.0775** 
(0.0383) 
0.0777** 
(0.0385) 
gdp_cap 0.0194*** 
(0.00662) 
0.0180** 
(0.00688) 
-0.616*** 
(0.129) 
-0.619*** 
(0.129) 
0.0345*** 
(0.00808) 
0.0338*** 
(0.00827) 
0.0199*** 
(0.00606) 
0.0187*** 
(0.00620) 
liberal_party 0.0148 
(0.0270) 
0.0184 
(0.0274) 
-0.572 
(0.547) 
-0.470 
(0.549) 
-0.0121 
(0.0287) 
-0.0162 
(0.0285) 
-0.00985 
(0.0209) 
-0.00946 
(0.0210) 
other_party -0.0803 
(0.0550) 
-0.0775 
(0.0539) 
0.958 
(1.282) 
1.002 
(1.278) 
-0.0500 
(0.0488) 
-0.0509 
(0.0500) 
-0.0916** 
(0.0412) 
-0.0903** 
(0.0415) 
yr2004 -0.0979* 
(0.0574) 
-0.104* 
(0.0574) 
4.180*** 
(0.543) 
4.132*** 
(0.543) 
0.104 
(0.0676) 
0.103 
(0.0674) 
-0.0117 
(0.0513) 
-0.0160 
(0.0512) 
yr2005 -0.193*** 
(0.0316) 
-0.198*** 
(0.0313) 
-1.913*** 
(0.700) 
-1.959*** 
(0.703) 
-0.0159 
(0.0446) 
-0.0165 
(0.0438) 
-0.144*** 
(0.0398) 
-0.148*** 
(0.0392) 
yr2009 0.251*** 
(0.0198) 
0.250*** 
(0.0198) 
-0.603 
(0.631) 
-0.604 
(0.632) 
-0.00512 
(0.0408) 
-0.00541 
(0.0407) 
0.142*** 
(0.0256) 
0.142*** 
(0.0255) 
Constant 15.34*** 
(0.123) 
15.37*** 
(0.125) 
20.52*** 
(2.611) 
20.76*** 
(2.581) 
14.61*** 
(0.134) 
14.62*** 
(0.135) 
15.92*** 
(0.123) 
15.95*** 
(0.125) 
Observations 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 
N_g 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
sigma_e 0.289 0.288 5.596 5.597 0.358 0.358 0.270 0.269 
sigma_u 0.746 0.748 4.779 4.787 0.948 0.950 0.764 0.767 
rho 0.869 0.871 0.422 0.422 0.875 0.876 0.889 0.890 
The logarithmic transformation of municipal grants (A1, A2), loans (B1, B2), own revenues (C1, C2) and total revenues (D1, D2) are the 
dependent variables of the fixed effects models (allowing for intragroup correlation in the prefecture level). The dummy variables 
aligned (=1 if municipality's and central government's affiliation are the same), pre_parl and pre_local (=1 for the years before the 
parliamentary (2003, 2007) and local (2006, 2010) elections respectively) and their interactions aligned_pre_parl and 
aligned_pre_local (in A2, B2, C2 and D2) are the main explanatory variables. We control for government affiliation (gover), prefecture 
GDP per Capita (gdp_cap), municipality affiliation (liberal_party, other_party) and year effects (yr2004, yr2005, yr2009).  We denote 
p-values by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 and report standard errors in parentheses. Standard deviation of residuals within 
municipalities and of the overall term in each model are denoted with σu and σe respectively, with ρ= σ2u +( σ
2
u+ σ
2
e) capturing the 
variance due to difference across panels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
TableS3: Fixed-effects Logit Regressions on Loans. 
 (B3) (B4) 
 D_Loans D_Loans 
aligned 0.0559 
(0.181) 
-0.0743 
(0.199) 
pre_parl 0.231 
(0.254) 
-0.120 
(0.322) 
aligned_pre_parl  
 
0.654* 
(0.369) 
pre_local 0.314 
(0.322) 
0.286 
(0.384) 
aligned_pre_local  
 
0.0801 
(0.415) 
gover -3.626*** 
(0.616) 
-3.747*** 
(0.621) 
gdp_cap 0.0331 
(0.0996) 
0.0401 
(0.0999) 
liberal_party -0.0143 
(0.280) 
-0.0154 
(0.289) 
other_party 0.139 
(0.545) 
0.118 
(0.545) 
yr2004 4.422*** 
(0.643) 
4.474*** 
(0.649) 
yr2005 0.423 
(0.439) 
0.443 
(0.441) 
yr2009 -0.133 
(0.245) 
-0.131 
(0.247) 
yr2010 -3.988*** 
(0.575) 
-4.119*** 
(0.581) 
Observations 1338 1338 
N_g 190 190 
The dichotomous variable D_Loans (=1 if loans>0, 0 otherwise) is the dependent variable 
(allowing for intragroup correlation in the prefecture level). The dummy variables aligned (=1 
if municipality's and central government's affiliation are the same), pre_parl and pre_local (=1 
for the years before the parliamentary (2003, 2007) and local (2006) elections respectively) 
and their interactions aligned_pre_parl and aligned_pre_local are the main explanatory 
variables. We control for government affiliation (gover), prefecture GDP/capita (gdp_cap), 
municipality affiliation (liberal_party, other_party) and year effects (yr2004, yr2005, yr2009 
yr2010).  We denote p-values by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 and report standard errors 
in parentheses. 
 
 
  
TableS4: Fixed-effects Panel Data Analysis of Municipal Revenues (log) considering 
year 2009 as pre-electoral (parliamentary) year. 
 (A1) (A2) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2) (D1) (D2) 
 log_Grants log_Grants log_Loans log_Loans log_OwnRev log_OwnRev log_Total log_Total 
aligned -0.00815 
(0.0244) 
-0.0488* 
(0.0272) 
0.295 
(0.281) 
-0.154 
(0.362) 
-0.0326 
(0.0327) 
-0.0242 
(0.0360) 
0.00309 
(0.0255) 
-0.0222 
(0.0288) 
pre_parl 0.0740*** 
(0.0170) 
0.0223 
(0.0196) 
0.250 
(0.539) 
-0.322 
(0.593) 
-0.0191 
(0.0292) 
-0.0234 
(0.0321) 
0.0416* 
(0.0213) 
0.00453 
(0.0266) 
aligned_pre_parl  
 
0.0957*** 
(0.0211) 
 
 
1.060** 
(0.512) 
 
 
0.00811 
(0.0179) 
 
 
0.0687*** 
(0.0211) 
pre_local -0.125*** 
(0.0361) 
-0.160*** 
(0.0326) 
0.547 
(0.734) 
0.159 
(0.779) 
-0.000172 
(0.0573) 
0.0397 
(0.0728) 
-0.0977** 
(0.0405) 
-0.109** 
(0.0451) 
aligned_pre_local  
 
0.0730*** 
(0.0264) 
 
 
0.801 
(0.748) 
 
 
-0.0844 
(0.0550) 
 
 
0.0222 
(0.0325) 
gover 0.431*** 
(0.0712) 
0.423*** 
(0.0705) 
-6.542*** 
(1.070) 
-6.635*** 
(1.074) 
-0.110 
(0.0923) 
-0.113 
(0.0926) 
0.258*** 
(0.0628) 
0.251*** 
(0.0628) 
gdp_cap 0.00160 
(0.0102) 
0.00224 
(0.0101) 
0.104 
(0.193) 
0.111 
(0.195) 
0.0471*** 
(0.0123) 
0.0473*** 
(0.0123) 
0.00986 
(0.00887) 
0.0104 
(0.00869) 
liberal_party 0.0141 
(0.0246) 
0.00289 
(0.0247) 
-0.578 
(0.561) 
-0.701 
(0.579) 
-0.0124 
(0.0288) 
-0.00542 
(0.0311) 
-0.0103 
(0.0195) 
-0.0156 
(0.0205) 
other_party -0.0588 
(0.0485) 
-0.0638 
(0.0483) 
0.273 
(1.421) 
0.217 
(1.431) 
-0.0611 
(0.0497) 
-0.0602 
(0.0506) 
-0.0794** 
(0.0361) 
-0.0826** 
(0.0374) 
yr2004 -0.177** 
(0.0767) 
-0.179** 
(0.0761) 
7.306*** 
(0.894) 
7.284*** 
(0.888) 
0.158 
(0.0970) 
0.161 
(0.0976) 
-0.0564 
(0.0675) 
-0.0568 
(0.0674) 
yr2005 -0.265*** 
(0.0471) 
-0.267*** 
(0.0461) 
0.907 
(0.921) 
0.884 
(0.913) 
0.0330 
(0.0753) 
0.0358 
(0.0759) 
-0.184*** 
(0.0522) 
-0.185*** 
(0.0518) 
yr2010 0.274*** 
(0.0511) 
0.260*** 
(0.0517) 
-7.533*** 
(1.251) 
-7.692*** 
(1.254) 
-0.104* 
(0.0521) 
-0.107** 
(0.0521) 
0.128*** 
(0.0434) 
0.117** 
(0.0446) 
Constant 15.40*** 
(0.169) 
15.43*** 
(0.165) 
10.68*** 
(3.000) 
10.94*** 
(3.029) 
14.41*** 
(0.196) 
14.40*** 
(0.196) 
15.96*** 
(0.153) 
15.97*** 
(0.151) 
Observations 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 1469 
N_g 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
sigma_e 0.300 0.300 5.518 5.516 0.357 0.357 0.274 0.274 
sigma_u 0.751 0.752 3.201 3.213 0.926 0.926 0.776 0.776 
rho 0.862 0.863 0.252 0.253 0.870 0.870 0.889 0.889 
The logarithmic transformation of municipal grants (A1, A2), loans (B1, B2), own revenues (C1, C2) and total revenues (D1, D2) are the 
dependent variables of the fixed-effects models (allowing for intragroup correlation in the prefecture level). The dummy variables 
aligned (=1 if municipality's and central government's affiliation are the same), pre_parl and pre_local (=1 for the years before the 
parliamentary (2003, 2007, 2009) and local (2006) elections respectively) and their interactions aligned_pre_parl and 
aligned_pre_local (in A2, B2, C2 and D2) are the main explanatory variables. We control for government affiliation (gover), prefecture 
GDP per Capita (gdp_cap), municipality affiliation (liberal_party, other_party) and year effects (yr2004, yr2005, yr2010).  We denote 
p-values by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 and report standard errors in parentheses. Standard deviation of residuals within 
municipalities and of the overall term in each model are denoted with σu and σe respectively, with ρ= σ2u +( σ
2
u+ σ
2
e) capturing the 
variance due to difference across panels. 
 
  
 
Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1: Number and population of municipalities by affiliation and size (‘000s) in 
2003 
  
 
Figure 2: Number of municipalities by alignment across the electoral time line 
 
Figure 3: (left) Share of each subcategory of the local budget (pooled data from all 
municipalities and all periods). In the outer ring of the pie chart we group these 
  
subcategories into tree principal revenues' categories: grants (RED), own revenues 
(GREEN) and loans (ORANGE). (right) Total annual municipal revenues and the 3 
principal categories for the period 2003-2010, projected on the electoral timeline (green 
(light) when PASOK and blue (dark) when ND in government), with the red lines 
indicating the election dates. 
 
 
